The economic approach to human behaviour The economic approach to human behaviour under scrutiny: an overview of arguments under scrutiny: an overview of arguments for the autonomy of social action for the autonomy of social action Abstract. The article reviews and re-examines some arguments against the treatment of social action within the economic approach as an extension of economic behaviour/ rationality and thus against its denial of the speci®c, irreducible nature of the extra-economic. A major argument is that social action is a sui generis phenomenon that cannot be reduced with theoretical impunity to its economic modalities. Social action is characterized by substantial autonomy relative to economic behaviour/ rationality. Arguments about the autonomous character of social action seek to remedy the indiscriminate extension of the economic approach beyond the ®eld of economy to all human behaviour construed as consistent utility maximization. These arguments adduce certain classes of factors (socio-psychological, socio-cultural, socio-systemic and others) contributing toward the autonomy of social action. In addition, the economic-approach treatment of the human actor as Homo economicus is reversed by conceiving the economy as a domain of social action of which economic behaviour is a special case.
Particularly examined is the economic approach's underlying negation of the distinctive raison d'eÃtre of social, extra-economic action in relation to its economic counterpart. Reviewed are some pertinent arguments against such treatment of social action by the economic approach. In this regard, a general argument to be reviewed and further elaborated is that social, non-economic action features a complex, distinctive and in part autonomous character vis-a-vis economic behaviour. According to this argument, the differentia speci®ca of social action is especially manifest in relation to rational economic conduct.
Advocates of the economic approach to human social behaviour usually de®ne rational action as the``generalized calculus of utilityoptimizing behaviour'' (Stigler and Becker, 1977) , i.e. the consistent pursuit of self-interest via accurate cost±bene®t calculations. Thus in the economic approach to social action rationality involves maximization of some utility, viz. wealth, gains and other maximands, or minimization of disutility, such as costs and monetary losses. The argument that social action is a phenomenon sui generis vis-a-vis rational economic behaviour casts doubt on the argument of the economic approach that the social has no autonomy but is a derivation of the economic. This is discussed below.
The complex, distinctive and autonomous nature of social action with respect to economic rationality is exempli®ed in the predominance of power, domination and related factors in political action versus pro®t, wealth and other materialist ends. This power argument assumes that political capital has primacy over economic capital in a particular sphere of social action. That social action has an autonomous structure is indicated by the preponderant role of social distinction, honour or prestige compared to economic rationality in vast segments of human behaviour. Such a status argument posits the primacy of social capital over economic capital. The autonomous structure of social action is epitomized in the prevalence of such socio-psychological irrational forces as emotions or sentiments as compared to the rational-economic in many modes of social action (Paperman [2000] examines the contribution of emotions to the impartiality of decisions, Wolfelsperger [1998] the relations between rationality and emotionality in social interaction, and Elster [1999] those between reason, interest and passion in Eastern European transitions; for a survey of the general role of emotions in socio-economic life see Elster, 1998) . The same argument is implied in Weberian affective action as well as Paretian residues (sentiments) and derivations (rationalizations) suggestingmatter other economic variables such as exchange, money and market ± as forms of social action (Weber, 1968: 635±6) and interaction (Simmel, 1990: 82±90) rather than reduce social (inter)action to capital as is done by the economic approach to human behaviour. Unlike most proponents of the economic approach, Marx did not really think that everything in society was capital, i.e. accumulated economic values to be used for the sake of material pro®t, as shown inter alia by his awareness of the autonomous power of ideas as well as social ties. Whereas for Marx (1967) economic capital was a social relationship par excellence, permeated by domination and exploitation, and in Weber (1968) and Simmel (1990) a special case of social (inter)action re¯ecting sociological relations in the economy, modern economists and some sociologists tend to view all social relations or sociological variables as extensions of economic capital, i.e. as capital transactions, pecuniary interactions, market exchange, transaction costs, gain±loss calculi, etc.
Thus the modern economic approach follows orthodox economics in committing the fallacy of commodity fetishism (Ackerman, 1997: 659) through the commodi®cation of all social relations, as exposed by Marx and Durkheim in their own distinctive ways. This commission implies a double fallacy of misplaced concreteness. First, the social actions and interrelations of human subjects are misconstrued as relations between inanimate objects, i.e. consumption commodities (outputs) and capital goods (inputs) in the market, an objection Marx made to classical political economy. Second, at best these actions and relations of¯esh-and-blood dramatis personae are misplaced as automatic and rational (self-interested) transactions between representatives of an anaemic ± and Durkheim (1964) would add anomic ± one-dimensional Homo economicus (Bowles, 1998) aiming at utility±pro®t optimization, an objection Durkheim made to Spencer as well as to Smith et al.
Social action and rational economic behaviour
The preceding implies that social action is irreducible to what is just one of its modes, viz. rational, economic or utilitarian (Barber, 1993: 15) . This casts doubts on various attempts to create an imperial economics viewed as a universal grammar of social science with an ever-expanding domain (Demsetz, 1997) . Hence arguments positing that social action is a sui generis category in relation to rational economic behaviour rationality challenge the economic approach or utilitarian paradigm, which has come to be applied not only to the economy but to an expanded spectrum of social phenomena, ranging from politics, laws and institutions to ethics, family and interpersonal relations (BuÈ scher, 1993: 311; Etzioni, 1988: ix) . This is an attempt to use the economic approach to create a theory of everything (Hodgson, 1998 : 168) ± and hence nothing de®nitely (Smelser, 1992: 403; see also Ackerman, 1997: 663) .
Moreover, given the well-documented relevance of non-economic types of social action, these arguments expose the paradox that, instead of integrating extra-economic variables, the economic approach seeks to generalize and expand its tools into virtually all areas of social life. But, as leading economists (Arrow, 1997: 761) advise their colleagues, there is a risk in applying market reasoning as well as cost±bene®t analysis to politics, law and other noneconomic realms because it is easy to neglect imponderables and to concentrate on tangibles. Admittedly economists pronounce on non-economic issues at their peril, for the social sciences other than economics are distinct disciplines (Krugman, 1997: 120) .
No wonder the resulting depiction of various non-economic forms of social action as driven by the instrumentally rational pursuit of self-interest (Friedman, 1995: 21) , and thus their reduction to Weberian instrumentally rational action (ZweckrationalitaÈt), has often been quali®ed as a naive caricature (Ackerman, 1997) . Admittedly the economic approach to social action, including political behaviour, is founded on the behavioural premise that actors behave rationally by pursuing their self-interests, although casual observation and systematic evidence alike suggest that they do not always act in a rational manner and are not motivated merely by the``very narrow de®nitions of self-interest'' (Mueller, 1997: 10) . Nevertheless, the``Expeditionary Forces'' (Demsetz, 1997) of the economic approach have extended their concepts and tools to an increasing range of social phenomena, including, for example, homelessness. It is, for instance, argued that the so-called richest, rational utility-optimizing homeless individual is precisely``indifferent'' to alternatives such as abandoned quality housing at market®xed rent and the condition of homelessness at zero rent, so by the inexorable operation of iron economic laws the incidence of homelessness is conditioned by``rational calculation [sic!]'' (Quigley, 1996 (Quigley, : 1935 . Homelessness is simply a matter of free and rational decision on the part of freely choosing individuals (Buchanan, 1991a: 31±6) between non-zero market-determined rent (or mortgage) and zero rent. In general, such extensions of the economic approach as manifestations of economic imperialism carry with them their own dangers, such as pathologies, paradoxes or persistent anomalies (Green and Shapiro, 1994) in the political and other non-economic areas, threatening the validity of economic theory overall (Miller, 1997 (Miller, : 1181 .
In retrospect, such classical sociologists as Weber, Pareto, Durkheim and Simmel have vigorously defended the autonomy of social action vis-a-vis economic behaviour/rationality. Thus Weber (1949: 67; 1976: 183) exposes the one-sidedness of the economic approach ± including the materialistic conception of history ± found in pure economics as attempting to become a general social science. Weber, for instance, uses the following expressions to characterize the economic approach in pure economics: simplistic assumptions, naturalistic monism, non-realistic or abstract, neglect of non-economic considerations, monistic naturalism. Somewhat ironically, some mainstream economists (Arrow, 1997: 765) subscribe to ontological pluralism when it comes to social decisionmaking systems and, by implication, to pluralist, multidimensional or integrative sociological theories as found in Weber and Durkheim (Parsons, 1937) as well as in contemporary European writers (e.g. Bourdieu, 1988; Giddens, 1984) . For Weber (1968: 71 ) the degree of signi®cance of the economic factor in social action cannot be assumed a priori as is done by both the materialistic conception and the economic approach, but must be ascertained empirically in every particular case because a de®nite class of causes determines this signi®cance. Thus the extent to which social action takes place in accordance with the operation of the economic factor can be assessed only in the light of historical experience and evidence (Weber, 1968: 10) . This position implies delimitation of the realm of social action in which economic rationality is pertinent, and thus of the scope of the application of the economic approach to human behaviour.
Speci®cally, Weber sees rational orientation as signi®cant primarily for what he calls managerial activity rather than for any economic behaviour, let alone all social action. In Weber's framework, since managerial or entrepreneurial activity is a form of economic action that involves producers (or sellers), consumers' behaviour would by implication be excluded from the realm of economic rationality, as is also explicitly emphasized by Veblen et al. Moreover, Weber (1949: 68) suggests that, in many cases, not only the economic conditioning but the economic rami®cations of social and cultural phenomena should be taken into account. The ®rst assumption constitutes the stepping-stone of the economic approach to social action as well as of the vulgar materialistic conception (on some early detections of their commonalities see Durkheim, 1966; Weber, 1977) , 1 i.e. of a peculiar theoretical compound ± or a seemingly terminological oxymoron ± amounting to rationalist-utilitarian Marxism. By contrast, the second assumption is the foundation of what Durkheim, Weber and other economists and sociologists call sociological economics (Knight, 1958: 19) 2 or economic sociology (for a recent exposition of Weberian economic sociology see Swedberg, 1998 ; on classical economic sociology overall see Gislain and Steiner, 1995 ; on the relations of Durkheim's economic sociology to institutional economics, Gislain and Steiner, 1999) or the sociology of economic life (see .
The classical sociological argument for the complexity, distinctiveness and autonomy of modes of social action in relation to economic rationality stipulates that these have```laws of their own', and even apart from this fact may be co-determined by other than economic causes'' (Weber, 1968: 341) . Along similar lines, some other major economists and sociologists regard a universal economic-utilitarian approach to social action, i.e. some kind of rationalist model, as implausible as a non-Euclidean geometry (Pareto, 1932 . Some classical economists even attributed a certain autonomy to social action by admitting that``with respect to those parts of human conduct of which wealth is not the principal object, to those political economy does not pretend that its conclusions are applicable'' (Mill, 1968: 139±40) . However, it is precisely such claims and arguments that modern economists make by applying the economic approach to literally``all human behaviour'' (Becker, 1976: 3±8) .
Hence, the problem of the autonomy and distinctiveness of social action versus economic rationality reappears and needs further consideration in the light of such recent arguments effectively denying such autonomy. For that purpose, the ensuing overview re-examines and classi®es certain arguments concerning the autonomy of social action and its underlying factors. Such arguments divide the factors making for the autonomy of social action into four interconnected classes: socio-psychological, socio-cultural, systemic and others. Furthermore, these arguments suggest conceptualizing the economy as a realm, and economic behaviour as a special case, of social action, thus turning on its head the portrayal of society by the economic approach as an overarching marketplace and its dissolution of human agency into rational utility optimization.
Arguments about the socio-psychological factors of the autonomy of social action One major socio-psychological factor in the autonomy of social action is that extra-economic goods seem less, or not at all, governed by the law of diminishing marginal utility (relative satiation) 3 than are their economic counterparts. In particular, this applies to such extra-economic variables as power and social status in relation to commodities, money and wealth. While any additional amount of material goods tends to have a lesser subjective value for the actor ± this is the essence of the neo-classical law of marginal utility or value (for con¯icting, neo-classical and institutionalist approaches to value in economics between the two wars see Yonay, 1997 ) ± this is hardly so with extra amounts of power and prestige and in relation to non-material variables.
Such a tendency casts doubt on the implicit assumption of neoclassical economics that everything under the sun is governed by the law of (decreasing) marginal utility, i.e. both economic quantities and extra-economic entities, such as power, status and in¯uence, as well as freedom, justice, peace, morality and beliefs. Moreover, these non-economic goods may often be subject to some law of increasing marginal utility. This may occur when increased levels of power and prestige bring about a higher, rather than a lower, level of satisfaction (despite the aspiration level). This curious phenomenon may explain the tendency toward seeking not just power as such but rather absolute or unlimited power at almost any economic cost, 4 and thus partly account for the phenomenon of political dictatorship. The tendency of many people to keep or further their social reputation (good name) at substantial material cost in wealth (the budget constraint) can also be accounted for by such a phenomenon.
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Thus after a certain threshold of the realization of materialistic ends ± a threshold at which the law of diminishing marginal utility comes into full operation ± the force of non-economic ends sets in and eventually overwhelms that of the former in the domain of social (and often economic) action. Hence in most cases reaching and especially transcending this threshold of materialism is to some degree a phenomenon of af¯uence and a product of moral evolution (Dore, 1992: 175) , which reportedly leads to a lower valuation of basic material things relative to the non-or post-material. For instance, studies report that there exists evidence of a postmaterialist dimension in social relations (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart and Baker, 2000) , including labour±capital con¯icts (Weakliem, 1991) , in many Western European countries such as France, Italy and the Netherlands.
This social trend toward increasing salience and often dominance of post-materialist dimensions is also implicit in Engel's laws of consumer demand, as empirical generalizations relating consumption to income. For instance, the established ®nding that the income elasticity of the demand for basic material goods, especially food, is smaller than 1 indicates that the marginal utility of these goods dramatically diminishes with their increase in quantity and, vice versa, increases visibly with their relative rari®cation. No wonder Walras's (1926: 175±6) original term for marginal utility was rareteÂ in the sense of a positive relationship between scarcity and the utility of a marginal unit of commodity. Now, the operation of Engel's law of consumption, in conjunction with technological advances in agriculture, tends to produce decreases in the share of consumer expenditure devoted to food in developed and developing countries alike (Johnston, 1997: 11) .
This can provide a rationale for extra-economic, especially political, regulations of food and related production, which are often vulnerable to economic objections. Reportedly the output of the food sector, even within developed market economies, is more dependent on such political variables as government policies and ideologies than on strictly economic factors (Harrigan, 1997: 485) . Here is another trivial but indicative example: when, in a typically hypocritical (American?) way, contradicting the zealous advocacy of``free and fair'' trade (including the binding NAFTA agreement), the``US recently imposed utterly indefensible restrictions on Mexican tomato exports, an of®cial remarked that Florida has a lot of electoral votes while Mexico has none. The economically correct rebuttal is to point out that the other 49 states contain a lot of pizza lovers'' (Krugman, 1997: 119) . However, such economic rebuttals do not seem to carry much weight in the arena of politics, including government intervention in the economy, compared to extra-economic considerations. On the other hand, this does not necessarily mean economic Machiavellism or the reckless pursuit of material interest, as implied by the economic approach. If anything, non-economic Machiavellism in politics ± especially gaining and holding power for its own sake rather than for extrinsic materialistic bene®ts ± is a more plausible proposition than rentseeking or pro®teering associated with economic Machiavellism. It is ironic that some exponents of the economic theory of politics have unwittingly conceded this. Admittedly, economists' standard argument about seeking materialistic ends, as an explanation of market-economic behaviour,``pales in innocence'' (Mueller, 1996: 346) in comparison with the argument (and evidence) concerning the pursuit of political power for its``own sake'' (Weber, 1968: 979) .
This suggests that political action has an autocephalous logic and con®guration (see Miller, 1997 for a recent critical examination of economic models of politics) in that, whereas wealth can be an important political tool, the political process tends to be preeminently one of a non-economic nature. Reportedly most social actions and relations of a non-economic character seem to be guided by values and motives different from economic ones, such as naked greed (Wilson and Musick, 1997: 695) . Hence, the social actor, including Homo politicus, appears as essentially different from, especially more complex, more socialized and thus more human than, some one-sided Homo economicus (Bowles, 1998) depicted as a two-legged calculator (Etzioni, 1991) or a maximizing robot.
Consequently such a more socialized view of social actors offers a more complex and dif®cult modelling problem (Miller, 1997 (Miller, : 1178 , and thus does justice to the real-life¯esh-and-blood dramatis personae (Bowles, 1998: 78) , despite some lamentations. Some economists (Rodrik, 1996: 37) do complain about the depiction of the political actor or Homo politicus as different ± e.g. characterized by myopia or irrationality ± from Homo economicus, presumed to be rational and forward-looking. However, this complaint does not seem warranted, at least for the element of group and other social mediation in the polity (Miller, 1997) . Similar objections apply to other complaints in this connection. For example, other economists (e.g. Fox, 1996 : 49±50) lament some recent tendencies in development theory and policy, objecting that it is dubious for the economic profession, starting from the assumption of selfinterest or individual rationality, to provide behavioural explanations that neglect political subjects' own interests.
Moreover, the real-world socio-political actor can modify the venerable concept of Homo economicus as it originated in (neo)classical economics and was perpetuated in the modern economic approach. For instance, understanding the behaviour of such political subjects as voters can contribute to rede®ning and re®ning the very concept of the rational economic actor ±``complete with information-saving devices, ideologies, and socially determined sanctions'' (Miller, 1997 (Miller, : 1200 . Thus participation in political actions as particular forms of collective action and structures is far from being identical to participation in the market, as believed by public-choice theorists. Notably, group mediation makes individual actors' participation in the political sphere largely different from that in the market realm (Miller, 1997 (Miller, : 1181 ). This in turn implies that political competition is a speci®c phenomenon with its own raison d'etre and thus cannot simply be equated to economic competition in the market (Nechyba, 1997) .
Further, market-economic competition itself is just a subset of a larger genus, viz. a particular form of social action (Weber, 1968) or social interaction (Simmel, 1990) . In retrospect, the equation of political (and all social) competition to market competition has been routinely made by economists and public-choice theorists since Schumpeter's de®nition of democracy. However, there seem to be some differences in this regard. While Schumpeter and other earlier economists tend to apply the notion of free-market competition to the political (democratic) process as a methodological tool (analogy) or as a metaphor (Yeager, 1997) , the polity is not a market in the literal sense (Arrow, 1997) , though most representatives of the economic approach to social action really seem to think so.
Still, a few public-choice theorists have come to realize that the assumption of competition in government does not always rest on solid grounds (Nechyba, 1997 (Nechyba, : 2063 . Such a realization notwithstanding, their typical proposition is that government is like the market, i.e. a network of exchange transactions, and hence that the relative sizes of government-and market-organized activities are produced by supposedly identical processes of free and open competition (Wagner, 1997b: 163) . Generally speaking, in the economic approach the polity is characterized as a political marketplace (Cordes, 1997: 171) . However, this characterization seems to be no more than an analogy or a simple metaphor (Yeager, 1997: 155) . For the polity is constituted by a variety of non-market political institutions (Cordes, 1997: 169) and is therefore not a literal market (Arrow, 1997: 762) . The political system is far from being a market-like entity characterized by free competition and exchange simply because the market``is one system; the polity another'' (Arrow, 1997: 765) . Hence, political and other social exchange (another metaphor) is radically different from economic exchange, as the latter is characterized by the market valuation of exchange objects (Dore, 1992: 160) in contrast to the absence or irrelevance of this valuation in the former.
These statements about power and political behaviour also apply to prestige or status and corresponding social actions. Reportedly (Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996; Bakshi and Chen, 1996) , in economic terms social actors often tend to be more sensitive to changes in social status or relative income (Frank, 1996: 122) than they are tō uctuations in absolute income. The pursuit of relative income via Veblenian pecuniary emulation and invidious comparisons or social-comparison functions re¯ects prestige considerations, not just materialistic interests. Thus, the members of Veblen's leisure class would order their alternative states largely on the basis of their standards of pecuniary emulation or relative income standings (Arrow, 1950: 333) , or simply according to social status. Seeking relative income rather than, or in conjunction with, absolute income would thus con®rm the thesis that human (and even economic) satisfaction is a matter of (invidious) social comparison ± i.e. that pleasure, even happiness, is a comparative variable. 6 This is possible because further additions or subtractions of prestige tend to have greater salience (marginal utility) for social actors than do corresponding changes in their wealth (after a certain material threshold is reached). Given such increase or constancy of the marginal utility of prestige (Stigler, 1950: 324) , 7 social actors seek out ever new means and realms of social distinction (Aschaffenburg and Maas, 1997: 586) . Such new realms can include, for example, charity and generally voluntary donations. In the light of this possibility, some analysts (e.g. Glazer and Konrad, 1996) propose, following Veblen's implicit views, a signalling explanation for charity, which is assumed to be induced by the desire to demonstrate wealth in order to signal status by (preferably observable and non-anonymous) donations (Harbaugh, 1998) . 8 The more conventional or more socially approved ways and realms of statusseeking can range from wealth or economic capital and power or political capital to superior education, 9 skills, health or human capital, in general, to knowledge of higher culture or cultural capital, as shown by Bourdieu, Veblen, Weber and others. In consequence, for social actors distinction and other non-economic ends are ultimate values (Weber, 1968: 109) in relation to which wealth and other economic variables serve as means (Alexander, 1990: 345) .
In contrast to power, status and related social variables, pro®t, wealth and other economic factors do not seem to have independent value for social actors. It seems to be a myth that individuals seek only to accumulate wealth (Burke, 1997: 149) . The latter is used as a currency to buy things desired, above all status and power, at a level dictated by the identity standard. Thus money and wealth have little intrinsic value, their primary meaning resulting from the ability of actors to exchange them for other more valuable things. Furthermore, experimental studies (e.g. Camerer, 1997: 186) ®nd that reciprocal social values such as fairness and altruism (and revenge) are widely observed in laboratory conditions. And not only economic bene®ts but also social rewards can be used as both an end and a medium or currency of exchange (Miller, 1997 (Miller, : 1178 , as studies of political and other forms of collective action show. As an illustration, the individual participation in the 1989± 90 revolution in East Germany was closely associated with membership of certain social networks ± especially those composed of friends and other signi®cant others ± which in turn generated de®nite moral obligations and social expectations of participation on the part of the individual members (Jasso and Opp, 1997) . A more socialized view of political and generally human action can have far-reaching implications for economic theory in that it embeds the rational actor in an immanently social world rather than in thè`a tomistic universe of most economics'' (Miller, 1997 (Miller, : 1178 . Thus, both experimental and real-life settings suggest that there are limits to monetary compensation and related extrinsic incentives in comparison to altruism, civic duty, personal trust, prestige and generally intrinsic or non-economic motivation. Some analysts (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) report the pre-eminent role of civic duty in NIMBY (not in my backyard) situations, such as hosting of obnoxious or dangerous facilities, like nuclear and other power plants. In the light of such limitations to monetary and related extrinsic motives relative to intrinsic motivation, they propose a modi®ed model of human behaviour, with Homo economicus maturus as a key concept, which seems radically different from that of conventional economic man.
In general, many economists now admit that in much of social and even economic behaviour intrinsic and extrinsic motives, for example norms and economic incentives, interact (Kreps, 1997) . Ironically, some economists (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997: 753) think that this theory of intrinsic motivation, in social as well as market behaviour, is consistent with the economic approach and can thus be incorporated into mainstream economics. This seems questionable, since the latter has conventionally been based precisely on the assumption of extrinsic motivation or hard (thin) rationality. At best, incorporation of alternative intrinsic motivation or soft (thick) rationality can make the economic approach a tautology 10 beyond recognition (Green and Shapiro, 1994) , in which all behaviour is deemed rational by the new criteria of soft, thick or second-order rationality (Friedman, 1995) . Yet the narrower hard or thin version is empirically dubious in that it rests on admittedly unrealistic, strong assumptions about rationality (Young, 1996: 121) . It has become increasingly evident that actual social, including economic, action often deviates from the premise of rationality in its extreme form of maximization ± as distinguished from satis®cing or bounded rationality ± which most economists routinely use in formal modelling (Rabin, 1997 (Rabin, : 2046 .
A related socio-psychological reason for which social, and often economic, action is largely dominated by variables other than purely economic ones is the negative impact that the unrestrained pursuit of naked material interests can have on the actor's selfesteem, identity, inner satisfaction or psychological equilibrium. No wonder various individual pathologies have often been associated with such pursuits, as Durkheim classically demonstrated (1964) in his exploration of the impact of the excessive seeking of gain and thus of economic success (and failure) on suicide. The actor's psychological equilibrium is often disturbed ceteris paribus by excessive indulgence in material acquisition for its own sake, with neglect of other ends. Ultimately economic rationality can turn out to be, in the words of Weber (1968: 52±3) , absolutely irrational from the perspective of the happiness of the single individual.
Hence, the prospect of happiness historically often had nothing to do with mere economic satisfaction or wealth, but everything to do with higher purposes of a mainly religious, ethical and generally transcendental, extra-economic character. This was shown by the behaviour of the working class in early capitalism and a fortiori in the Middle Ages: namely, it was possible for the working classes to accept the prospect or fate of life-long poverty so long as the promise of``eternal happiness'' was held out to them as well (Weber, 1927: 369) . Contrary to the rational-choice equation of seeking materialist ends ± with rationality as well as happiness equated to the level of wealth, welfare, utility or money ± historically the freeing and exclusive pursuit of economic interest has, ironically, generated``only irrational results'' (Weber, 1927: 356) .
11 Economic hyper-rationality thus mutates into non-rationality or irrationality (Elster, 1989: 9; Schumpeter, 1951 : 173±8) on its own terms, re¯ect-ing an``irrationally rational passion for impassionate calculation [rationality]'' (Clark, 1918: 24;  cf. also Knight, 1964) .
Arguments about the socio-cultural factors of the autonomy of social action
The socio-cultural factors involved in the autonomous character of social action relative to economic rationality express the fact that human actors are social creatures with a universal desire (Frank, 1996: 117) for gaining approval in society rather than monadic Robinson Crusoes living in a Hobbesian state of nature. The presence and salience of such factors thus make problematic the penchant of the advocates of the economic approach to``model Robinson Crusoe and pretend he's a $7 trillion [society]'' (Conlisk, 1996: 686) . Hence the main socio-cultural factor in this respect is the complex social-cultural nature and logic, including institutional constitution and structuring, of human agents and their behaviour in society. Notably such complexity is epitomized in the fact that social actors are induced by multiple and complex socio-culturally conditioned motives, especially institutionalized motivation (Parsons, 1990) , involving a wide range of what Weber (1968: 202) termed material and ideal interests, i.e. empirical and transcendental orientations to action (Alexander, 1990) . Alternatively, this sociocultural constitution of social actors and their actions does not justify their portrayal, in traditional economics as well as the current economic approach, as embodiments of some natural-born Homo economicus as the presumed model (or caricature) of human nature (Ackerman, 1997) .
Particularly, the existence of various social-cultural constraints on reckless pro®t-making, wealth accumulation and pursuit of material interest generally is an important factor in the autonomy of social action vis-a-vis economic rationality. For instance, excessive pro®t-seeking by ruggedly egoistic individuals or groups is present in virtually all societies, including the USA, but is socio-culturally sanctioned (stigmatized) as pro®teering. Thus,``excessive gainseeking is kept under control for most people most of the time by the fact of its social nature [and] the inherent social constraints on gainseeking are universally effective in keeping the drive for more under control'' (Danner, 1996: 56±7) . This holds true of modern society, as shown in the implicit cultural sanction, e.g. ethical and social disapproval, of, for instance, the corruption of such primordial emanations of the basic social bond as the notion of goodwill into a term for some``ugly anti-social forms of pro®t-seeking'' (Dore, 1992: 160) .
In retrospect, most societies and cultures have de®ned such forms of pro®t-seeking and economic maximizing generally as``semipathological, semi-criminal propensities'' (Keynes, 1972: 278) when compared with the pursuit of power, social status and other extra-economic ends. In consequence of such social (de)construction, in economic and social history there has been a strong tendency toward tempering the unrestricted pursuit of pro®t, resulting from the injection of economic principles of gain-seeking into the internal household or rural economy, the outcome being a``regulated economic life with the economic impulse functioning within bounds'' (Weber, 1927: 356) .
No wonder merchants, traders, pedlars, brokers, bankers and other assumed pathological emanations of rational economic man are, in most traditional and even modern societies, viewed as almost social outcasts and thus ascribed lower social status (in Weber and Bourdieu's sense of honour, prestige or distinction, not economic class) than those engaging in non-economic activities. This low-status attribution to the consistent and unrestricted quest of gain in both traditional and modern societies has been historically demonstrated by Veblen, Weber and others.
12 Thus Weber (1927: 357) observed that, in traditional societies in antiquity and the Middle Ages, the ethos of classical economic morality is condensed in the ancient judgement that merchants may behave without siǹ`b ut cannot be pleasing to God''. Moreover, in the modern era, the reportedly typical antipathy of Catholic as well as Lutheran ethics ± in contrast to Calvinism ± to capitalistic developments derives in essence from the``repugnance of the impersonality of relations within a capitalistic economy'' (Weber, 1927: 357) . For instance, the medieval economic ethic sought to exclude haggling, overpricing and free market competition, and rested on the principles of just prices and fair wages, prohibition of interest and thè`a ssurance to everyone of a chance to live'' (Weber, 1927: 358) .
In consequence, what most defenders of the economic approach consider social universals and ingrained propensities, namely such economic activities as Adam Smith called truck, barter and exchange, were initially regarded, in medieval Europe, as destructive passions (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992; Hirschman, 1977) . But even the social ethic of modern capitalism negatively sanctions excessive bargaining and pro®teering as well as what Americans call cut-throat competition. Alongside extraneous government and other regulation of market competition, including price controls (e.g. US cable rates in recent years), this is evidenced by limitations on haggling (as in ®xed-price stores), seen by many people as almost morally repugnant, which is why most are too inhibited (shy) to engage in it despite the possibility of better deals. Overpricing in modern market economies is also ethically sanctioned, as shown by various low-price commitments, and so is low quality by money-back guarantees. And the medieval notion of just price is far from being a thing of the past, as indicated by the presence in modern economies of ideas of fair prices, wages, trade and other variations on the theme of economic justice as an ethical principle.
Finally, the seemingly trivial dictum``live and let live'' is to some degree a modern rami®cation of the medieval principle that everybody is to be given a chance to live. Ironically (or perhaps not), even in the US this negative social construction of Homo economicus has also been non-trivially evidenced by the low social esteem ± reported by most surveys ± of such hyper-rational actors as cardealers, as well as stock-and real-estate brokers, insofar as these are, as a rule, socio-culturally constructed as reckless opportunists engaged in self-seeking with guile. If this is so``even in America where capitalism seems to be generally more hard-nosed than in Europe'' (Dore, 1992: 174) , it holds true a fortiori for the latter as well as for Japan. As to Japan, for instance, observers (Dore, 1992: 163±7) indicate that opportunism may be a lesser danger there than in American cowboy-capitalism because the manifest inducement and factual predominance of moralized exchange relationships of mutual goodwill counter the portrayal of actors, in the economic approach, as hard-nosed short-run pro®t-optimizers who trust no one (including so to speak, themselves) and who try to pro®teer or cheat everyone else. Such observations expose the empirical inadequacy of the standard economic assumption of self-seeking with guile or post-contractual opportunism as some kind of social universal or human nature. 13 Moreover, modern Western capitalism ± with quali®cations for America as the``only remaining primitive [capitalist] society'' (Baudrillard, 1988 : 7) ± tends to generate certain non-and anti-capitalist attitudes and policies which mitigate and even prevent its operation in accordance with capitalist logic, whose consequences increasingly engender``moral disapproval'' (Schumpeter, 1951: 178) .
Hence, in modern capitalism, especially in its early stages, wealth accumulation involved an ethical dilemma akin to that faced by the medieval monasteries: religious guilt``led to wealth, wealth to fall from grace, and this again to the necessity of re-constitution'' (Weber, 1927: 367) . Given this socially constructed negative association between wealth or money and grace or morality, modern capitalism has always tried to resolve or mitigate this moral legacy from pre-capitalist society, for it was experienced as an impediment to capital acquisition. This was especially true of Protestant capitalism, as shown by the Calvinist solution to the dilemma between wealth accumulation and ethical-religious guilt by the notion of calling. Speci®cally, this dilemma was resolved in the following manner. Calvinism``sought to avoid this [dilemma] through the idea that man was only an administrator of what God had given him; it condemned enjoyment, yet permitted no¯ight from the world but regarded working together, with its rational discipline, as the religious task of the individual. Out of this system of thought came`calling' [which] expresses the value placed upon rational activity carried on according to the rational capitalist principle, as the ful®lment of a God-given task'' (Weber, 1927: 367) . No doubt this Calvinist solution may have signi®cantly lessened the negative linkage, as socio-culturally (re)created between economic worth and moral worthiness, by providing a positive religious sanction of the former as a calling pleasing to God.
However, this Calvinist solution to the moral dilemma of wealth has historically been far from being de®nitive or absolutely prevalent, even within Protestantism, and is in fact not found in some other Protestant sects such as Lutheranism. Moreover, it has been traditionally non-existent or rejected in Catholicism ± as well as in Islam (Kuran, 1996) ± as indicated inter alia by the prohibition (still not of®cially revoked by the Vatican's religious authorities) on interest or capital gain, in contrast to the Calvinist, albeit somewhat reluctant, acceptance of it as consistent with God's will. Moreover, the very Calvinist resolution of the dilemma seems to have consisted in identifying moral-religious grace not only with economic success in a calling, but also with both successful and honourable performance of this calling. This implies that wealth acquired by dishonourable means would not count toward attaining religious rewards (salvation). So rational economic activity is far from being morally neutral, even for Calvinist entrepreneurs, but it is subject to ethical as well as other transcendental sanctions (as partly implied in Buchanan, 1991b: 208±12) . In other words, the Calvinist solution to the problem of economic rationality versus morality consisted in the fact that the Protestant ascetic communities' admission to the``Lord's Supper was conditioned on ethical ®tness, which was identi®ed with business honor [and success] , while into the content of one's faith no one inquired'' (Weber, 1927: 368) .
Yet this was not the case with either Lutheranism or Catholicism, for the element of business success and generally engaging in a calling was quite secondary, and usually insuf®cient, to attain religious grace, as opposed to the very content and expression of faith, including religious contemplation, church participation and confession. Like Calvinism, however, both the Catholic and the Lutheran Churches acknowledged and observed ecclesiastic discipline (Weber, 1927: 368) , but independently of any identi®cation of religious-ethical worth with business success or even with business honour in the narrow sense, as honour was far more broadly conceived to involve a wide range of social actions. This suggests that the negative attitude toward economic (hyper)rationality might have been a historically more common tendency than the prevalence of this rationality in social action. Since the economic approach argues that economic rationality prevails in social action, such a tendency implies invalidating and turning this argument on its head.
Arguments about the systemic factors of the autonomy of social action
The systemic or socio-structural factors that give social action an autonomous structure operate in such a way that society would dissolve into a Hobbesian world of bellum omnium contra omnes if all social actors were to follow the principle of economic rationality, viz. the micro-economic model of maximization of expected utility (Coleman, 1990) , including pro®t and wealth (Kiser and Hechter, 1998) . Ironically this has at times been conceded by some proponents of the economic approach, who typically assume such individual behaviour. Admittedly society``would collapse overnight if all persons, or even a large share of persons, should suddenly commence to behave strictly in accordance with the utility-maximising models of orthodox [rational] choice theory and within the constraints only of formal legal enforcement structures'' (Buchanan, 1991b: 211) . Such collapse would be the likely aggregate or systemic outcome of such individual actions, in spite of the miracle of the assumed magical transformation of private vices into public virtues by an invisible hand (Mueller, 1993: 405) . The question remains, however, if such statements about the destructive impact of individual utility maximization on social structure are but internal contradictions, given the initial premise or ad hoc hypotheses in a post hoc theory development. At any rate, the universal pursuit of material interests or economic goals would be defeated in its aggregate systemic consequences by the danger of injuring the social system at its economic heart or transforming it into an anti-social state of nature.
By contrast, the pursuit of non-economic ends by human agents does not seem to affect society in the same way or to the same degree, including power-seeking for its own sake within a democracy. As to the latter, the historical experience of the US, the UK and France seems to suggest that a democracy is relatively more capable, especially in the long run, of preventing such disastrous aggregate effects of individuals' or groups' pursuit of power than is a free-market economy to preclude those of pro®t-seeking with guile by``recklessly sel®sh monad[s]'' (Frank, 1996: 117) . For in a democracy there exists a variety of extra-economic rules and institutions, such as constitutions, which regulate such power pursuits and, while often applied to a market economy as well, they here have a different role, force or effect compared to the polity.
For instance, the American constitution has been able to preclude or mitigate political dictatorship, in spite of some tendencies toward oppressive social control in the USA since the 1980s. These tendencies have been especially directed toward moral over-control (Heckathorn, 1990) imposing the new temperance that expresses the perennial``American obsession with sin and vice'' (Wagner, 1997a ). This imposition is implemented via the criminalization and Draconian sanctioning ± e.g. the three-strikes policy and mass executions unknown in democracies ± of various sins, vices and other immoral or politically incorrect behaviours. For example, such politically incorrect behaviours ± as de®ned by American moral entrepreneurs (political and religious leaders) ± facing the full wrath of the``law of the land'', including the death penalty, range from drug and alcohol use (Friedman, 1997) to abortion (about 30 US states criminalize so-called partial-birth abortions with prison terms of up to 20 years) and contraception (the famous French morning-after pill is still illegal in the``land of freedom''), not to mention sexual harassment and related vaguely de®ned sexual crimes (e.g. date or marriage rape) invented by an unlikely coalition of extreme conservatives and militant feminists. Nevertheless, in the face of these tendencies toward social hypercontrol and limitation and violation of basic individual freedoms and choices (e.g. abortion) in recent years, as repeatedly reported by human rights organizations, Tocqueville's Democracy in America has displayed resilience due mainly to certain countervailing forces (``liberals'') counteracting such conservative onslaughts on liberty.
Yet the power of the American (or other) constitution seems more limited in respect to the aggregate social inef®ciencies (e.g. environmental damage) of rugged individualism (for a reappraisal of methodological individualism, see Zouboulakis, 1997) or private business in the American (in essence, cowboy) way, as well as to economic calamities such as depressions or major recessions. In the USA, the constitution has at least been more instrumental in reducing the likelihood, or moderating the effects, of the tyranny of the majority than of economic pathologies. This holds true despite the American permanent conservative revolution with symptoms of authoritarian conservatism, particularly the increasing severity of social, especially crime, control in recent years and the comparatively low index of political democracy in advanced societies (cf. Smits et al., 1998) .
For example, the US constitution was helpless in the case of the Great Depression in the 1930s or the in¯ation in the 1970s and similar economic calamities. It is true that the US constitution did not prevent the Civil War (or, for that matter, McCarthyism) either. But its subsequent enforcement was comparatively more successful in ending the war (or McCarthyism) than it was historically in curing the Great Depression and similar economic events, including the 1970s stag¯ation, the 1980s budget de®cits, declining real wages since the 1970s and various economic pathologies. The latter include, for example, pollution by manufacturing ®rms, the various unsound practices of tobacco companies, the comparatively low quality of many American products, including food, cars and consumer electronics, the extinction of some socially venerable companies (e.g. Delta's cut-throat elimination of PanAm as an international carrier), dubious mergers and other voluntary restrictions of free competition in its mutation into monopolistic or oligopolistic competition, Wall Street speculative crazes and other excesses, and consumer manipulation through advertising and fraud. Included in economic pathologies are also rampant income disparities, third-world style sweat-shops and other forms of labour exploitation, systematic denials or restrictions ± by a coalition of big business, states and federal government, as witnessed by their unison actions in breaking many strikes in the 1980 and 1990s ± of internationally recognized labour rights such as union organization and collective bargaining, lack of any economic democracy, etc. All of this makes the American economy as a whole often appear as, metaphorically speaking, a gigantic sweat-shop.
This would suggest some kind of serendipitous inversion of the scope of application of Smith's principle of the invisible hand. Speci®cally, it seems that the principle operates more in the domain of social action, including political behaviour, insofar as it is induced by non-materialistic ends, than in that of economic action if this is driven by opposite ends. Private vices, viz. the individual pursuit of power and status, therefore actually lead to public virtues.
In this connection, a digression on the origin of the theorem of the invisible hand may be instructive. In retrospect, the invisible hand or laissez-faire theorem, the sacred truth of neo-classical economics, originated or was adumbrated in philosophy and novels rather than in an exact economic analysis. The notion applies to related venerable principles of economics, which were thus mere provisional assumptions, derived from an incomplete hypothesis, not from actual facts (Keynes, 1972: 282±3) or indisputable axioms. The literary source of the invisible-hand hypothesis was Mandeville's fable of the bees. The moral of this fable, intended for children's education, was that private vices lead, through the operation of some mysterious force ± later economists identi®ed this force with the market ± to public virtues, so such vices can in fact be for the good of the public (Weber, 1927: 369) . The fable apparently re¯ected the optimism of the Enlightenment, with its belief in the harmony of interests, thus replacing Protestant asceticism in the ®eld of economic ideas (Weber, 1927: 369) . Aside from Smith's conception of the invisible hand, of a simple and obvious market system of natural liberty (cf. also Buchanan, 1991b: 24) , in political economy this belief in economic nirvana culminated in the somewhat grotesque form of the economic harmonies of Bastiat (1860) and his modern followers. Some of these latter believers in the laissez-faire doctrine, in a discussion of free trade versus its opposites (Krugman, 1997: 113) , approvingly quote Bastiat, whose theories of economic harmony have long been thought of as popular economic caricatures (cf. Knight, 1958 ). Yet even some neo-classical economists would object that such a nirvana may amount to the``peace of the cemetery'' (Mises, 1952: 96) . And so may some sociologists' (e.g. Coleman's) proposals for rational reconstruction of society, as they also rely on the magic of an invisible hand to naturally harmonize private pro®ts with social interests.
Most proponents of the economic approach also dogmatically assert that only the individual pursuit of material self-interest, not just by economic agents in a market economy (as in Smith), but by political actors in a polity, will, through a hidden hand, result in public bene®ts. Presumably this assumption is so universal that it applies to all political systems, both to democracies and to autocracies. It is thus argued that the very self-interest prompting autocrats to maximize their extraction from a society also makes them interested in the productivity of their society (McGuire and Olson, 1996) . The same is said of a democratic government, viz. just as autocrats choose their optimal tax rates independent of their decisions as to whether or how many public goods to provide, every democratic majority seeking re-redistribution does the same (McGuire and Olson, 1996) . And so on. What is posited is that the invisible hand of material interest operates not only in the economy but also in politics, and thus that individual economic rationalities or private vices are a suf®cient condition of social rationality or public virtues. Alas, this proposition is contradicted by the assertion that individual rationality is actually insuf®cient for social rationality (Olson, 1996: 23) . However, such internal contradictions do not seem to be a deterrent to ± and are often glossed over or undetected by ± hard-core economists' attempts to expand the economic approach to every form of human behaviour. Still, such internal contradictions can be self-defeating to the economic approach to social behaviour, including its political and social exchange versions.
In addition, this application of the invisible-hand theorem to politics implies some kind of economic Machiavellism in political behaviour, i.e. materialistic self-seeking with guile or postcontractual opportunism. The following equation is thereby established: the invisible hand of the market or of material self-interest in the economy the hidden hand of economic Machiavellism, or of material self-interest in politics, including absolutist regimes. However, absolutist authority, for example, tends to be economically inef®cient and not guided by any invisible hand to promote the public interest.
14 Hence, as even some economists suggest, the central problem is to establish an institutional framework within which complex political processes (and economic transactions) take place, as against discretionary decisions and choices made by some``absolutist authority'' (Wagner, 1997b: 162) , no matter how benevolent, enlightened or economically rational. Even a democratic polity populated by Machiavellian actors is not likely, via an assumedly bene®cent hidden hand of material interest, to realize its own political objectives (the common good).
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Reliance on self-interest as a universal principle in political and social behaviour can, moreover, be a recipe for disaster for the polity and society as a whole, as occasionally admitted by some economic theorists (Buchanan, 1991b: 208±11) . In practical terms, the issue at stake is thus whether laws, institutions and state policies promote the common good or are responses to narrow individual interests ± as in American-style interest-group politics combining circus and tragedy ± as revealed through the``process of collective choice'' (Cordes, 1997: 172) . Since the pursuit of individual interests does not necessarily lead to the common good, the equation of private vices and public virtues, as the essence of the invisiblehand theorem, falls apart, at least in the realm of political and social behaviour. What is more, even in a free-market economy, strategic behaviour or individual rationality in many cases, such as that of oligopolistic industries, produces outcomes that are decidedly undesirable from a social viewpoint (Leahy and Neary, 1997: 658) .
The eventual defence, as implied in the assumed rational-choice logic of collective action, that the invisible-hand theorem of selfinterest applies to economic as well as political behaviour but not to collective action, and that thus there is contradiction, is tenuous. First, such a defence is logically untenable and epistemologically useless: the ostensibly universal theorem now holds for some phenomena but not for others. The question then arises: if the invisible hand of self-interest leads to bene®cent aggregate economic and political outcomes ± and thus indirectly to (spontaneous) collective action ± why cannot the same mechanism generate collective action in so-called latent or large groups (Olson, 1971: 48±52) . In other words, why is, in one case, individual rationality suf®cient for social rationality (McGuire and Olson, 1996) and, in the other, not (Olson, 1996: 23) ? After all, the logic is the same in both cases. It is the logic of material interest or individual rationality conceived as conducive, via aggregation, to furthering social rationality and thus allowing collective action to achieve these goals. In empirical terms, this defence is rather weak. For real political action is but a particular, if not the most salient, form of collective action.
In addition, even the economy is not a sphere of individual rational action alone, but often of collective action as well. To say that the invisible hand operates in the economy as well as in the polity through self-interested action or participation and that, in the realm of collective action, it fails to operate via equally selfinterested inaction or non-participation is just another way of stating a contradiction. For one thing, the ®rst proposition ± i.e. that private vices always lead to public virtues in economic, let alone political, behaviour ± should be treated not as an axiom but as a useful working hypothesis. The second proposition, that large-scale collective action and generally social rationality are impossible because of the logic of self-interest in the absence of selective incentives, has repeatedly been falsi®ed by empirical studies and exposed as``positively bizarre'' (Margolis, 1982: 17) by everyday observation. 16 But the issue here is not so much the empirical validity of these two propositions as the logical inconsistencies between them. And no subterfuge can exorcize these and other internal contradictions in the economic approach to all social action, which is thus denied almost any autonomy in relation to economic rationality.
At this juncture, a caveat is in order. No normative arguments ± aÁ la orthodox economics or current economic approach (for the role of norms and value judgements in normative economics, see Mongin, 1999 ) ± are made above, in the sense that individuals should not behave as economic maximizers (e.g. pro®t-or rentseekers) since such conduct would produce aggregate inef®ciencies or social irrationalities. Implicit instead are positive arguments. Namely, rather than prescribing that, since society would collapse if all individuals behaved as economic maximizers, they should not behave so (a normative statement), it is only stated that the existence of society proves that most of them apparently do not (a positive statement). Thus, the inference that individuals are not necessarily economic maximizers 17 is simply drawn from the moment that society as such does not disintegrate (not yet) into a Hobbesian universal war among its members, although some particular societal types historically did in the past, and may in the future.
Arguments about the other factors of the autonomy of social action
Among the other factors of the autonomy of social action versus economic rationality can be included those of a technical-economic character. A universal and accurate pro®t±loss calculus in respect to extra-economic variables can be to some degree unfeasible in technical and costly in economic terms and, in conjunction with its social-cultural deconstruction, inappropriate in moral terms. For instance, exchange values, prices and markets cannot be readily formed for non-economic, and especially intangible, variables. Despite the fact that social theory is increasingly af¯icted with such economic-approach concepts as imputed or shadow prices for children and spouses, marriage markets, political marketplace, psychic income, religious costs and bene®ts, and the like, these prices and markets are admittedly not literal (Arrow, 1997) ; at best they are metaphors. To the extent of being non-amenable or resistant to strict economic valuation in money terms or to market reasoning, most social variables thus represent invaluable goods or incalculable categories.
In much of the economic approach, as in orthodox economics, social actors are often depicted as pseudo-economic or utilitarian automatons who calculate the prices not only of material goods but also of non-material things. In knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing, such actors appear as what some contemporary economists (Sen, 1977) have called rational fools or foolish rationalists (cf. Clark, 1918 ). Yet leading contemporary economists admonish that neo-classical utility theory does not necessarily attach a price to everything and,``regardless of our all-embracing market theories, we economists must recognise that there are goods that might be bought and sold but aren't [for] the rhetoric of the market may violate our intuitions [which shows] the risk in applying market reasoning [to non-economic realms]'' (Arrow, 1997: 759±65) .
Further, beyond what Simmel (1990: 263) 18 would call the threshold of economic realization and awareness, instrumental and formal economic rationality (Weber's ZweckrationalitaÈt) can become secondary (Boudon, 1998) in relation to value-laden (WertrationalitaÈt), axiological or substantive rationality, and to emotional forces (Elster, 1998) and traditional or habitual factors (Hodgson, 1998) . Similarly, (material) interests might become of auxiliary importance relative to residues or sentiments and derivations or rationalizations, including Freudian libidinal and related irrational forces as a particular class of residues, 19 within Pareto's framework. Hence, after the threshold of economic realization, e.g. a certain level of wealth or consumption, is reached, value imperatives rather than material interests (greed) shape most social (inter)actions (Wilson and Musick, 1997: 695) .
In light of the tendency for social action to be dominated by non-economic factors once the threshold of materialism is transcended ± or not attained, action taking place below it (Simmel, 1990 : 263±5) ± and that of post-materialism 20 is reached, it is implausible to discard as Paretian derivations or Freudian rationalizations of self-interest actors' commitments to values such as justice, caring or social responsibility (Wuthnow, 1991) . A fortiori the same seems to hold true of family commitments and relations. For instance, even some economists (Bergstrom, 1996 (Bergstrom, : 1903 observe that most people's sympathies and affections are entwined in a complex web of family ties, and purist economists, with their trained (in)capacity to model society as no more than a marketplace involving interactions among self-interested actors, view this fact as an``embarrassing nuisance''.
Overall, the sphere of social action seems largely devoid of economic-type calculation or monetary accounting. For social actors only with reluctance, if ever, and then accompanied by socio-cultural sanctions (Friedman, 1995) , engage in a cost±bene®t calculation of political action (e.g. voting), as well as ideological conviction, social respect, love and hatred, life and death, religiosity and morality, and related ideal variables or human values. However, even when referring to the dif®culty of monetary valuation or calculation of life, death and other human values, most economists are prone to think in terms of the market, risk and uncertainty. For example, while conceding the existence of invaluable goods, leading economists (Arrow, 1997: 759) assert that, when the likelihood of death is high enough, no price or premium suf®ces for the risk to be underwritten on the grounds that high risks have no monetary equivalent. Yet the idea that life and death as such, regardless of any level of life expectancy or death risks, perhaps have no monetary equivalents because they occupy an incommensurable realm (Zelizer, 1992: 297) seems outside the grasp of the economic approach to human behaviour.
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In sum, the technical-economic impossibility of a coherent accounting of such extra-economic variables thus combines with the socio-cultural sanction of such an accounting to induce actors to pursue diffuse non-materialistic ends without bothering about balance-sheets or income statements in their social actions. In Weber's terms, actors tend to behave, in their social actions, according to substantive rationality of ultimate values (the ethic of absolute ends) of a non-economic character, although some of their economic (e.g. entrepreneurial) actions can be oriented by the formal or economic rationality of cost±bene®t calculations.
The economy as a realm of social action
In a radical inversion of the depiction of society as a universal marketplace by the economic approach and its reduction of all social action to economic action/rationality, it may well be more plausible to conceptualize the economy as an integral element of society, and economic action as a special case of social action. Hence, the economy (or economic action) itself can be conceived as a realm (form) of social action oriented toward attaining noneconomic, rather than purely economic, goals. At least economic and non-economic goals or motives often operate in conjunction, in the actual course of economic and social action. In contrast to the failure of much of modern economics to consider the process of intertwining economic and non-economic motives, when actors pursue economic objectives in their interrelations with others these objectives are intertwined with sociability, approval, status, power and other non-economic motives such as self-realization , largely neglected in orthodox economics, though their pursuit is not necessarily non-rational (Granovetter, 1992: 233) . Now, if one thereby assumes the existence of economic ends ± ironically, denied by some neo-classical economists (Robbins, 1952) 22 ± economic action may well be just one means to some other ends of a non-economic character. Thus seeking money, pro®t or wealth and materialistic ends generally (Mueller, 1996: 346) can be instrumental in achieving power, status, justice, religious salvation, morality and other extra-economic ends as ultimate values (Weber, 1968: 109) in this regard. Since the ®rst serve as means to the second, economic variables have no inherent value or signi®cance relative to social ones, and so neither does the economy vis-a-vis society. This is because the economy is not populated by monadic and recklessly sel®sh Robinson Crusoes (Conlisk, 1996; Frank, 1996) who are assumed to be impervious to social considerations (as portrayed in the economic approach). Rather, the economy is better conceived as inhabited by human subjects for whom exactly such considerations are primary or eventual forces in their actions by virtue of the fact that they live in a society. In Weber's (1975: 84) terms, such a status of economic ends suggests that these are critically affected by the totality of cultural life, which thus implies the exogenous social determination or``heteronomy of practical economic aims''. This picture emerges from beneath the surface of the modern market and a fortiori traditional economy guided by the social nature of economic action. Such a picture thus transcends not only the neo-classical description of the market economy as an aggregate, asocial Robinson Crusoe driven by its own internal logic, but also the current depiction by the economic approach of society as an appendix of the market and ruled by the deus ex machina of utility maximization. And any usefulness of the utilitymaximization concept for precise calculation is actually destroyed by such formulations of the concept outside (Margolis, 1982) and even inside (Dore, 1992; Etzioni, 1988 ) the economic realm.
At this juncture, the economy can be depicted as a social theatre rather than society being portrayed as a universal marketplace. Hence, social, including economic, actors bear more resemblance to Shakespearean creatures with all their ambivalences and complexities than to some one-dimensional Homo economicus, as assumed by the economic approach. It is curious that the modern economic approach to social behaviour, especially its political version, tends to be more economistic than mainstream economics. The irony is that the image of social actors as representatives of thè`s pecies Homo economicus, while supposedly hypothetical even in economics textbooks, is, in the practice of [this approach] taken for granted as an obvious truth'' (Friedman, 1995: 3) .
This picture of the economy radically reverses the portrayal not only of the economy but of all society as merely a marketplace for realizing pro®t and other materialistic ends. Thus if the term marketplace is used, given the dominance of non-economic ends, including social status, it is more accurate to denote the economy as a vanity fair or a marketplace of vanity (Weber, 1976: 176) rather than the exclusive realm of pro®t/utility maximization. In this connection, the economy appears as a social scene on which actors try to attain, display or simulate power, rank, distinction, in¯uence, approval, justice, equality, morality, religiosity and related noneconomic expressions of vanity. Not only luxuries but also much of the modern economy is grounded in this tendency, which indicates the presence and salience of non-rational elements in actual economic action (Weber, 1975: 190) .
In modern Western society, this tendency culminates perhaps during Christmas in the form of a gigantic potlatch (LeÂ vi-Strauss, 1971: 65±6) . 23 Similarly, today's Japanese society is characterized by a pattern of mid-summer and year-end gift exchanges symbolizing recognition of obligations (Dore, 1992: 164) . The phenomenon of the Christmas potlatch has a social rationale of its own, though not necessarily an economic rationality, in that it carries what economists would call deadweight loss in cost±bene®t terms, namely, Christmas gifts appear irrational in economic terms, resulting in deadweight losses as the presumed difference between their (higher) market prices and the (lower) value that the recipients put on them. For example, some economists calculate that between one-tenth and one-third of the value of Christmas gifts is destroyed by giving, and ®nds the reason in the fact that people``do not especially value the objects they receive'' (Waldfogel, 1996 (Waldfogel, : 1306 .
Besides being methodologically problematic in comparing the incomparable, viz. economic quantities with non-economic variables, this computation seems to re¯ect the view of a social actor as a cynical Homo economicus, who attaches a price tag to everything, including gifts, 24 but attributes (non-monetary) value to nothing. However, from a sociological perspective that emphasizes individual values or Weberian subjective meanings rather than market prices or objective money costs, a different picture may emerge. Thus, such gifts may be rational in non-economic terms since a gift received``is often far more valuable to the recipient than its market price'' (Solnick and Hemenway, 1996: 1304) . The key reason for such valuation of gifts is the in¯uence of various non-economic considerations, including the emotional and symbolic (status) value of gifts, such as those received from signi®cant others and reference groups, respectively. Consequently, what economists call the deadweight loss of Christmas gifts is not only lower in economic terms than their computations indicate, but is actually non-existent in social terms. In general, this suggests that, from a social perspective, not only gift exchange but also typical economic transactions can hardly be fully dissociated from the pursuit of non-economic goals such as approval, status, sociability and power (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992: 7) .
In methodological terms, it seems bizarre and even mysterious to perform such cost±bene®t calculation of Christmas gifts, except for those economists calculating deadweight losses. For such computation relies on comparing the objective market prices of gifts with the subjective or psychological valuation of these gifts ± i.e. economic tangibles with non-economic imponderables. In a sense, such comparisons could indicate ± if there is deadweight loss for recipients ± the level of the inverse of consumer surplus. However, this may be an irrelevant exercise given that the Marshallian concept of consumer surplus has been largely abandoned in modern economics.
In this connection, it is perhaps in order to note a curious penchant of most modern American and other economists for applying not only their sell±buy rhetoric to everything, including ideas, values, culture and other non-economic phenomena, but also an even more morbid kill±death terminology. For them, following the speaking habits of American journalists and politicians, ideas and values, just as commodities, are sold and bought or killed. This is a problem of the sociology of knowledge, and largely outside of the scope of this analysis. The problem here pertains to the extent to which the peculiar (if not perverse) social structure of American society ± speci®cally its hard-core capitalism (Dore, 1992 : 174) of unprecedented commodi®cation, alienation and exploitation, as well as the highest homicide and execution rates in the developed world ± contributes to the creation of what Keynes (1972: 282±3) would call a semi-pathological rhetorical propensity among economists, lay public and politicians.
The case of Christmas gifts invoked above thus supports the thesis that money, pro®t or wealth have a raison d'eÃtre only as weapons, though potent ones, in this Balzacian-Shakespearean Human Comedy and Tragedy that human actors play even in the economic realm. More precisely, like the real world, HonoreÂ de Balzac's Human Comedy ± and, for that matter, Shakespeare's social stage ± is dominated by money or wealth as well as by power, status (vanity) and related variables. However, the former are most frequently used as means or intermediate goals to the latter as eventual ends. Here as elsewhere, economic ends either do not operate as such or, if they do, are instrumental in attaining some other ends. This would indicate the salience and often predominance of what sociologists like Weber (1968) and Durkheim (1926) , as well as some sociologically minded neo-classical economists (Wieser, 1967) , would call sociological relationships in the economy. This is expressed by the``constant in¯uence of noneconomic factors on economic action [i.e.] the causal heteronomy of the human economy'' (Weber, 1975: 80) .
If this is so in the economic realm, such a picture is a fortiori true of non-economic action. Ironically, the in¯uence illustrated above of non-rational variables on the economy would indicate the irrationality of economic phenomena (Weber, 1975: 97) , rather than their invariant rationality, as argued by neo-classical economists, and even less such rationality of all social action, as claimed by practitioners of the economic approach. Hence, the latter tend to avoid or disguise ± incidentally very successfully and cleverly ± the issue of the non-rationality of economic action by, instead, assuming the universal economic rationality of non-economic action. The social nature and constitution (sociality) of economic behaviour have thus been sacri®ced to the economic-utilitarian determinism of all social action, which shows the pathologies (Green and Shapiro, 1994) of the economic approach to social, including political, behaviour. In sum, this discussion suggests that various systemic, socio-cultural, socio-psychological and technicaleconomic factors, operating in unison, make non-economic types of social action follow their own logic, and thus give them an autonomous nature and operation versus economic behaviour/ rationality.
Conclusion
In the preceding discussion, I have reviewed and re-examined some arguments for the autonomy of social action in relation to economic behaviour, especially economic rationality or utility-optimizing behaviour. In retrospect, neo-classical economics assumes the absolute relevance of strictly rational-economic variables in the economy seen as a self-contained system. Furthermore, the economic approach to social behaviour extends orthodox economic principles and concepts beyond the sphere of the economy to all society and thus conceives the latter as a universal marketplace of pro®t optimization. Both conceptions, especially the second, have been questioned by these arguments, suggesting an alternative perspective on social action, including economic behaviour. As to the latter, this perspective sees the economy as a sphere of the (long-run) realization of non-economic ends and economic behaviour as being ultimately driven by non-economic forces, which contrasts with neoclassical conventional wisdom.
More important to the question under consideration, the arguments overviewed here radically challenge the economic approach in that they view non-economic variables as driving forces in most of social behaviour. These arguments thus question the assumption that all social action is driven by the logic of Homo economicus and his evolutionary mutants, viz. rational man (Coleman, 1990) , rational egoist Kanazawa, 1997), Restricted, Resourceful, Expecting, Evaluating, Maximizing Man (Lindenberg, 1992) and the like. Hence, the alternative arguments for the autonomy of social action do not take at face value the implied efforts and claims of the followers or sympathizers of the economic approach that theirs is a general (Kiser and Hechter, 1998) , even universal, theory. The economic approach to social behaviour thereby``produces the specter of an inclusive and universally applicable construct that simultaneously explains everything and therefore nothing'' (Smelser, 1992: 403) . These arguments would even suggest that the economic approach may belong to, paraphrasing Keynes (1960: 324) , the``species of remedy which cures the disease by killing the patient''. These arguments thus cast doubt on economists' and some sociologists' claims that choosing the economic approach is a rational decision of social analysis which should be attributed (in capital letters) Paradigmatic Privilege (Abell, 1992; Elster, 1979; Goldthorpe, 1998) .
The assumed primacy of non-economic variables in social behaviour implies a principle of sociality. Speci®cally, this principle is to be understood not so much in terms of interpersonal relations, interaction or sociation as in the sense of the social character, constitution and structuring of human behaviour, economic and non-economic alike. Hence, this is less a psychological principle than a sociological, i.e. social-systemic, principle since, for one thing, sociological factors, especially institutional and systemic ones, deeply underscore the psychology of social action (Blau, 1994) , including economic behaviour (Lewin, 1996) . The presumption that the law of economic rationality rules not only market activities but all human behaviours ± i.e. by utility maximization, pro®t-seeking, cost±bene®t computation or material self-interest ± is therefore turned on its head by the assumption of sociality of human action and actors. Yet the advocates of the economic approach use a euphemism termed the``charity principle'' to advance rationalist (``charitable'') interpretations and explanations of social actors and their actions, thereby justifying what they consider a well-grounded presumption of over-arching egoism and a sociality of``rational economic man'' or Robinson Crusoe conceived as representing human nature. Technically free of any ambiguities, second thoughts or euphemisms, the principle of sociality has a precise meaning ± i.e. the social logic and structure of human action, including the human economy.
In epistemological terms, the economic approach may be at best of partial relevance for the purpose of analysing social behaviour if the assumption of sociality is a fortiori true for non-economic behaviour, even more than for economic activities. This suggests that it is even more of some kind of head-in-sand (Frank, 1996: 119) approach than the neo-classical economics in which it is ostensibly grounded. At least neo-classical economics has a welldelimited realm such as economic behaviour in itself, and supplies de®nite and pertinent, though often unrealistic and incomplete, accounts of this realm. This contrasts with the economic approach and its ill-de®ned and spuriously universal domain embracing virtually all social phenomena. To that extent, the economic approach would have at best a partial raison d'etre as an all-embracing paradigm and method for analysing social action, i.e. no effective claims to paradigmatic privilege. Moreover, such a privilege has not been accorded unconditionally to this paradigm even within economics ± as shown by various schisms in the latter ± let alone in sociology and other social sciences.
In sum, the arguments for the autonomy of social action can contribute to addressing certain¯aws in the economic approach to human behaviour as well as, though less directly, in neo-classical economics. First of all, these arguments can redress the former's over-generalization and over-extension of a relatively narrow economic principle to all social action. In a related manner, such arguments partly rectify neo-classical economics' abstraction of economic behaviour from its social nature and context, by recognizing such properties of that behaviour. Weber (1977: 87) , the Marxian and by implication the economic approach to social behaviour is```materialist' in two senses. First, it entails that historical' processes are unequivocal consequences of the mode of production and the appropriation of`material' ± i.e. economic ± goods which prevails at any given time. Second, it entails that man's`historical' conduct is unambiguously determined by his`material' ± i.e. economic ± interests''. Even more explicitly and vigorously, Durkheim (1966: 255) states that the``dogma of economic materialism [is] the basis of both apparently opposed systems [such as orthodox economics and vulgar Marxism]''. In particular, Durkheim (1966: 255) notes that the``most opposite schools, orthodox economics and extreme socialists, unite to reduce government to the role of a more or less passive intermediary among the various social functions. The former wish to make it simply the guardian of individual contracts; the latter leave it the task of doing collective bookkeeping, i.e., of recording the demands of consumers, transmitting them to producers, inventorying the total revenue and distributing it according to a ®xed formula.'' 2. Knight (1958: 18±19) observes that, in the early 1900s, the Historical Economic School``broadened out, particularly in Germany, under such leaders as Max Weber and Werner Sombart into what is often called sociological economics, a position also well presented in France in the conception of economic sociology (sociologie eÂconomique)''. And it was Durkheim's economic and institutionalist sociology that ®rst supplied analytical bases for or had theoretical connections with the German historical school as well as American institutional economics (Dunning, 1997; Gislain and Steiner, 1999) .
3. Diminishing marginal utility logically implies at least relative satiation, though one of the standard axioms of consumption theory in modern economics is relative non-satiation, i.e. that more of any good, other things being equal, is always preferred by consumers. However, having more of any economic good decreases its utility or worth and thereby to some degree generates or approximates some point of relative satiation. Furthermore, possessing ever greater quantities of many economic goods, viz. foods, clothes, electronics, cars, furniture, etc., can, after some point, generate zero and even negative marginal utilities/externalities, unless one is a collector of such things. Hence the non-satiation axiom of consumption theory is to be abandoned as being in tension with the law of declining marginal utility or quali®ed along the lines proposed here. Speci®cally, in terms of Engel's laws, basic material needs would especially be subject to relative satiation, but higher spiritual needs would not, or at least not in an identical fashion. This is consonant with the argument that the law of diminishing utility does not apply in the same way or intensity to non-economic values as it does to economic quantities.
4. Economists might object that absolute power is a metaphor since the missing element is the economic cost (or the budget constraint) of attaining such a goal. Presumably it is hard to imagine that any dictator would spend all the resources on increasing power to the exclusion of other goals and activities. Yet it is often the case that most dictators and many nations seek to achieve absolute power employing virtually all their material resources or incurring any economic sacri®ces ± totalitarian societies and total world wars exemplify this tendency. The same would also apply to the pursuit of social prestige. As classically demonstrated by Veblen, Weber and others, actors frequently seek prestige by engaging in invidious social comparisons at almost any economic price or regardless of any budget constraint, and eventually at the negative-opportunity cost of ®nancial ruin (e.g. the aristocracy). Moreover, for these agents, such actions are completely rational in the sense of goal attainment, irrespective of their blatant economic irrationality. Hence it is an instance of pure economists' proverbial naiveteÂ or veil of ignorance to assume that material resources or budget constraints invariably restrain seeking absolute power, social status and other non-economic goals. At best, limited economic resources are just one type of constraint on the pursuit of such goals, the other types including non-economic factors as well, viz. political con®gurations (e.g. countervailing power), legal rules, social structure, morals, traditions, religion, ideology and other cultural values, etc.
5. This would also apply to individual behaviour within organizations. For instance, research reports that individuals``may experience negative reputational consequences in an organization by dropping person-to-person ties no longer valuable. The individual may need to preserve ties no longer instrumentally valuable because of norms against the breaking of ties'' (Podolny and Baron, 1997: 690±1) .
6. For instance, even hard-line contemporary economists admit that``one's pleasure from diamonds is reduced if many other people have them (or if none do!), and one's pleasure from a given income is reduced if others' incomes rise'' (Stigler, 1950: 324) . Similarly, earlier economists observe that``almost the whole value of strawberries in March, to those who like this tasteless mode of ostentation, is the fact that others cannot get them. The demand for diamonds, rubies, and sapphires is another example of this'' (Cunynghame, 1892: 37) .
7. It comes as no surprise that some neo-classical economists like Marshall (implicitly) and Pigou (explicitly)``should postulate the constancy of the marginal utility of prestige'' (Stigler, 1950: 324) .The following individual utility function (Pigou, 1903: 61) implies this postulate: U F {Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, K (ab)}, with Q1±Q4 being quantities consumed by individuals, a being some quantity possessed by other people, especially neighbours with social distance b, and K has a meaning similar to b. A more recent analysis of the role of social distance in social actions and decisions has been undertaken by Akerlof (1997) .
8. While allowing that charitable transfers are made for both prestige and intrinsic bene®ts, Harbaugh (1998: 277) also emphasizes the former. Arguably a substantial portion of these transfers is to be attributed to the prestige motive, so individual donations``are mainly compared with those of a reference group [and] the importance of reference groups might explain why fund-raisers often emphasize such social activities [that] strengthen such groups'' (Harbaugh, 1998: 281) .
9. Reportedly concerns for status and conformity are``primary determinants of individuals' educational attainment [as well as child-bearing and law-breaking behaviour]'' (Loury, 1998: 120) . Akerlof (1997) presents and substantiates such a status-based argument of social (and economic) action by invoking evidence from social anthropology/sociology.
10. As some neo-classical economists suggested, the proposition that``everyone seeks happiness [utility] might be considered as a factual assertion although it can be made true only at the expense of being made a tautology'' (Schumpeter, 1991: 333) .
11. In this connection, Weber (1927: 356) mentions the rationalist expeditions in search of gold undertaken by CorteÂ s and Pizarro.
12. Among early sociologists/economists, Ross (1899: 392) makes the following observation:``we might expect each man's economic effort to depend immediately on his utility. But this is not the case. Societies themselves get a characteristic adjustment between work and wants [leisure] and this consensus overrides the individual calculus.'' Hence Ross (1899: 392±3) asks:``What, save the might of usage and the contagion by example, can explain why the Western businessman, even when he has made a fortune, goes on working till he drops? Moreover, the same society changes its calculus from age to age.'' 13. As critiques of this assumption, as advanced among others by the new institutional economists like Williamson, object perhaps,``Williamson has evidence that is the way it is in America . . . Or perhaps he does not have much evidence about America either, and just assumes that`man' is a hard-nosed short-run pro®t-maximizer suspicious of everyone he deals with. Williamson's account does not provide the tools for explaining the difference between the Japanese and the British or American economies'' (Dore, 1992: 167) .
14. Arguably many past and present dictatorships in Africa, South America and Asia are instances of the inef®ciency of what McGuire and Olson (1996) see as a rational autocracy.
15. Namely,``if the behaviour of the various actors in the political marketplace will be largely driven by the pursuit of their self-interests, there is no guarantee that collective choice will lead to outcomes that are more ef®cient or equitable, than [those] that would emerge from a process of voluntary exchange'' (Cordes, 1997: 171) .
16. The economic (free-riding) logic of collective action, as an extension of the trivial prisoner's dilemma of individual rationality (defection) leading to group irrationality (suboptima), also overlooks the opposite possibility, viz. individual irrationality can be conducive to social rationality. For instance, individual overspending, including conspicuous consumption with its Veblen effects, and resulting low saving are typically considered, at least within mainstream economics, an economically non-rational behaviour, as shown by widespread lamentations about the falling saving rate in the US. (This applies to corporate and government spending.) And yet such non-rational behaviour can generate aggregate bene®cent outcomes, such as higher growth and employment rates, as demonstrated by the Keynesian positive association between the individual propensity to consume, i.e. effective demand, and employment/production (Eichenbaum, 1997) . For instance, twothirds of the US economy is driven by consumer spending, which is in turn largely driven by a quest for status (Frank, 1985) . On the other hand, at the root of Japan's recent aggregate economic inef®ciency lie the low consumption and high saving unperturbed even by an almost zero interest rate, i.e. individual rationality in conventional economic terms. Hence individual irrationality can, as in the case of the US and other mass-consumption societies, lead to social rationality ± speci®cally, micro-economic non-rationality (over-spending) to macro-economic ef®ciency (growth). This turns on its head the venerable prisoner's dilemma and its various frivolous extensions into the (self-interested) logic of collective action of latent (large) groups, positing the inverse relationship. In addition, such association between individual irrationality and social rationality can serve to reformulate the invisible-hand theorem of private vices, public virtues. Rather than assuming that the market's invisible hand performs a magical conversion (Mueller, 1993: 405) of narrow individual rationality (the pursuit of self-interest) into broader social rationality, it may well be more sensible to say that individual non-rationalities, such as Veblenian over-spending with no economic rationale, are transmuted through an invisible hand into collective rationality, viz. higher growth and employment. This would give the proper meaning to the dictum that private vices or sins ± and over-spending or prodigality has traditionally been viewed as one of them ± breed public virtues, including the wealth of nations. Finally, this suggests that it may well be equally if not more plausible to start with the assumption of individual non-rationality rather than that of individual rationality, contrary to the status of this latter as a ®rst-order (charity) principle with paradigmatic privilege in sociological extensions of the economic approach, not to mention orthodox economics of which it is a curious mutant.
17. Let us consider what can be called the passenger dilemma, which applies to individual behaviour in collective settings such as aeroplanes. In such situations, the dominant strategy for rational individuals is to carry as much luggage into the plane's passenger compartments as possible. (Technically, as many travellers know, individuals can be only partially prevented from implementing this strategy through monitoring or control by the plane's personnel, i.e. by punishments and other selective incentives, though controls are far more ef®cient regarding the other luggage at the check-in. So the element of control can be put aside.) And yet if everyone pursues this strategy, all will be worse off because of either externalities (crowding) or possible disaster. Here the universal and consistent pursuit of private self-interest or individual rationality (e.g. carrying the maximum weight of hand-luggage onto the plane) can result in collective irrationality (disaster). Generally this applies to those situations in which positive and negative selective incentives are either absent or inoperative. For example, the evidence that many common resource-pools are preserved because of internalized social norms (Sethi and Somanathan, 1996) and other intrinsic motivation implies that not all individuals are reckless utility maximizers, and thus contradicts the economic assumption of the tragedy of the commons (viz. private depredation of common property), assuming that all individuals are such free-riding maximizers. This would suggest that the tragedy of the commons and generally the prisoner's dilemma are based on spurious assumptions (private utility optimization or free-riding), from which equally specious propositions and conclusions are derived. Hence under the opposite assumption of individuals as other than utility maximizers or free-riders, viz. as civic-minded and co-operative (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) , no tragedy of the commons (Miller, 1997; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996) , even no prisoner's dilemma, would emerge, which shows that such dilemmas are but stringent (logical) derivations from false, at best dubious, premises, rather than universal real-life phenomena.
18. More speci®cally, according to Simmel (1990: 263±4) ,``a threshold of economic awareness exists that varies according to the wealth and temperament of the subject, so that economic appeals below that level are not experienced as economic ones. In this way, things become objects of law, aesthetic enjoyment and philosophical interest. '' 19. For illustration, some studies (Goodwin, 1997) have reported that Freudian libidinal ties play a critical part (promoting solidarity) in social movements and collective behaviour (e.g. the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, 1946±54).
20. Reportedly (World Values Study Group, 1994) , in recent years there has been a``worldwide trend away from concerns with material well-being toward a postmaterialist value system that emphasizes the free expression of ideas, greater democratization, and development of more humane societies'' (Macintosh, 1998: 452) . In comparative terms, however, the materialist/post-materialist dimension``is signi®-cantly less crystallized in poor countries than in rich ones. Clearly, values are more highly structured in relatively wealthy societies than in relatively poor societies'' (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995: 117) .
21. As an illustration of this possibility of a non-monetary valuation of life and death, historically even in American hard-line (money-is-all-you-need) capitalism, life insurance``threatened the sanctity of life by pricing it. In the earlier part of the 19th Century, the American public was not ready to commercialise death. Life insurance was rejected as sacrilegious enterprise'' (Zelizer, 1992: 297) . In a sociocultural interpretation (Zelizer, 1992: 285±7) , this event (life insurance) is just a particular example of the general problem of the complexities involved in the interaction of markets and human values, i.e. of the``problem of establishing monetary equivalences for such things as death, life, human organs, and generally ritualized items of behaviour considered sacred and therefore beyond the pale of monetary de®nition''. This is so given that market exchange,``although perfectly compatible with the modern values of ef®ciency and equality, con¯icts with human values which defy its impersonal, rational, and economizing in¯uence [so] cultural resistance to including certain items in the social order ± those related to human life, death and emotions ± into a market-type of exchange introduces systemic sources of strain and ambivalence into their marketing'' (Zelizer, 1992: 285±7) . In retrospect, the growth of individualism led to a new appreciation of the``in®nite worth of human personality [even sacralization of the human being], displacing the earlier utilitarianism with an absolute valuation of human beings'' (Zelizer, 1992: 287) .
22. Robbins (1952: 145) somewhat surprisingly states that``there are no economic ends, but only economic and non-economic ways of the attainment of given ends''.
23. LeÂ vi-Strauss (1971: 65±6) observes that in``our systems as well, ceremonies regulate the periodic recurrence and the traditional style of vast exchange operations. The exchange of Christmas presents is nothing but a gigantic potlatch implicating millions of individuals. By the vanity of the gifts, these exchanges take also the form of a vast and collective destruction of wealth. Even in our society, the destruction of wealth is a means of prestige.'' 24. Typically, most modern economists, especially``vigilantes of economic correctness'' (Hodgson, 1998: 189) , construe gift-giving as motivated by self-interest or exchange considerations without recourse to altruism as the underlying transfer motive (Stark and Falk, 1998: 275) . This is probably because they are unable to conceive altruism and generally morality as what Durkheim would call a sui generis phenomenon not reducible to egoism or utility. No wonder some of them criticize the work of Durkheim's pupil Mauss and other sociologists/anthropologists on gifts for attributing such autonomy to altruism and morality, viz. for turning à`b lind eye to the argument that [gift] return is prompted by gratitude [exchange motives], concentrating instead on the moral obligation of the recipient of a gift to reciprocate and on the social mechanisms that support, indeed mandate, reciprocity'' (Stark and Falk, 1998: 272) . Apparently, for these economists, gift-exchange is but a pseudo-market-exchange transaction in disguise (Stark and Falk, 1998: 275) . By contrast, broader economists (Akerlof, 1982) conceptualize certain economic transactions, viz. labour contracts between workers and ®rms, as partial giftexchange underlined by the sentiment of (co-worker) empathy rather than narrow self-interest, as the economic (exchange) model of gifts presumes.
